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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE MAIN PARKING MALL 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION; 
SALT LAKE CITY COMMISSION IN 
ITS CAPACITY AS REDEVELOP-
MENT AGENCY OF SALT LAKE 
CITY; and REDEVELOPMENT 
AGENCY OF SALT LAKE 
Defendants and Respondents. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
We are compelled because of certain statements 
made in the brief of Respondents to file this reply 
brief. 
The Respondents have included in their brief 
under the title "statement of facts" certain factual 
statements which are not in the record on appeal; 
neither were the same ever disclosed or brought to 
the attention of the trial court or this Appellant at 
the hearing on this matter. 
The Respondents on page 3 of their brief refer 
to the property, taken by threat of condemnation, 
which was held by a number of owners, including 
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in question obtained from the Appellant The Main 
Parking Mall bordered on the rear of the retail stores 
fronting on Main Street between Second and Third 
South and was used for parking and entrance to the 
rear of the retail establishments, this parking area 
becoming a part of the redevelopment project area 
designated Central Business District West (CBD 
West). 
The statement of facts set forth in Respondents' 
brief, and which are not a part of the record on 
appeal, and which were never disclosed or brought 
to the attention of the trial court, appear on pages 3 
and 4 of Respondents' brief and we quote the same 
for the convenience of this Court: 
"The purpose of the program under 
which the property was acquired is to re-
move blight. After blighted land has been 
acquired and cleared by the Agency, the land 
is made available for sale to private redevel-
opers at a price not less than the value of its 
reuse appraisal. A reuse appraisal is related 
to a particular proposed development and can-
not be made until the nature and scope of the 
proposed development is determined. 
"Primary considerations in the disposi-
tion process are: (1) nature, quality and 
design of the proposed improvements, (2) 
financial ability of the private redeveloper to 
complete proposed improvements, and (3) 
demonstrated experience or ability of the pri-
vate redevelopers to achieve the proposed 
results/' 
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We quote the following from page 5 of Respon-
dents'brief: 
« * * * The governing board of the Re-
development Agency, in proper exercise of its 
discretion, thereupon determined that only 
one of the four proposals, (that submitted by 
Hartnett-Shaw Development Company, Inc.) 
met the requirements which had been estab-
lished. The Hartnett-Shaw proposal was for a 
$40 million development containing an 18-
story Sheraton Hotel and a large office build-
ing." (Emphasis ours) 
It will be noted that in the transcript of the 
record on appeal there is no reference to the pages 
on which these statements appear. 
We must confess, however, that the inclusion 
of these statements by the Respondents definitely 
and conclusively demonstrate that there is a question 
of fact not resolved; that one of the main issues as 
raised by plaintiffs' complaint is the fact that the 
procedures required to be followed by Respondents 
were not complied with. The aforementioned state-
ments improperly included in this appeal claimed to 
have been followed by Respondents were not followed 
as alleged in plaintiff's complaint. 
For illustration, Exhibit F, as it is termed (R. 
228-231), was an agreement executed by Respondent 
Redevelopmnt Agency of Salt Lake City and the de-
veloper Hartnett-Shaw Development Company, Inc., 
which provides in paragraph 4, among other things, 
as follows: 
3 
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4. The purchase price of the subject 
property shall be determined by negotiation, 
but in no event shall be in excess of a range 
from $7.00 to $11.00 per square foot, but may 
be less than $7.00 per square foot. (R. 229) 
This paragraph of the agreement is diametri-
cally opposed to the statement included in the Res-
pondents' brief at pages 3 and 4, that the land would 
be made available for sale to private redevelopers at 
a price not less than the value of its reuse appraisal. 
There is no evidence in the record on appeal, nor 
was there at the trial, any disclosure of a reuse 
appraisal; Appellant knows of none. 
Therefore, paragraph 4 of Exhibit F (R. 229) 
as quoted herein is diametrically opposed to the pur-
pose of the program as outlined by the Respondents 
in their brief, which they say would be made avail-
able for sale to private redevelopers at a price not 
less than the value of its reuse appraisal. 
Paragraph 4 definitely states that the purchase 
price of the property shall in no event be in excess 
of a range from $7.00 to $11.00 per square foot, but 
may be less than $7.00 per square foot. A genuine 
issue of fact occurs, as in the amended complaint 
of plaintiff it alleges that the agreement to purchase 
as set forth in Exhibit F, paragraph 4 thereof, is 
below the market value and contrary to Article I, 
Section 105 (E) of the Neighborhood Development 
Program Master Agreements between the Respon-
dents and HUD, which were previously entered into 
between Respondents and HUD (R. 76). 
4 
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We refer this Honorable Court to the affidavit 
of Danny Wall, executive director of the Respondent, 
paragraph 4 thereof (R. 195), in which he states 
under oath as follows: 
"4. I am aware of rules and regulations 
issued by the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development prescribng procedures 
to be followed in developing the subject par-
cel of land, and I believe that all applicable 
provisions and requirements have been fairly 
followed and met by defendants." 
This is an absolute admission that they are re-
quired to follow the applicable provison requirements 
of HUD, and he further states that he believes that 
they have fairly followed and met the requirements. 
The issue raised by the complaint of the Appellant 
is that they have not met the requirements of the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD), which is required not only by contract but 
by statute, section 11-19-3. 
On page 5 of their brief the Respondents stated 
that the Redevelopment Agency, in the proper exer-
cise of its discretion, determined that only one of the 
four proposals (that submitted by Hartnett-Shaw 
Development Company, Inc.) met the requirements 
which had been established. There is nothing in the 
record, nor does the Appellant know of anything; 
that is, any requirements that had been established. 
This is another issue of fact. 
The Respondents improperly have incorporated 
in their brief to this Court matters which are not in 
5 
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the record, to the knowledge of the Appellant, and 
are asking this Court to consider them in making its 
determination of this appeal, as proven uncontra-
dicted facts. 
The statute, section 11-19-3, is very clear that 
the Redevelopment Agency, Respondent herein, may 
borrow money or accept financial or other assistance 
from the state or federal government for any re-
development project within [its area of] operation 
and comply with any conditions of such loan or 
grant. (Emphasis added) 
The issue as raised by the complaint of the 
Appellant is that the Respondents have not com-
plied with the conditions of the loan, and that by 
Section 11-19-3 Utah Code Annotated it must do so. 
We quote verbatum from the statute for the con-
venience of this Court: 
"11-19-3. Designation of redevelopment 
agency — powers and duties. — Each com-
munity by enactment of an ordinance by its 
legislative body may designate the legislative 
body of the community as the redevelopment 
agency of such community, which agency shall 
be authorized to enter into contracts generally 
and shall have power to transact the business 
and exercise all the powers provided for in 
this act. The agency may accept financial or 
other assistance from any public or private 
source for the agency's activities, powers, and 
duties, and expend any funds so received for 
any of the purposes of this act. The agency 
may borrow money or accept financial or other 
assistance from the state or the federal gov-
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ernment for any redevelopment project within 
[its area of] operation and comply with any 
conditions of such loan or grant." 
It is ridiculous to assume, as Respondents claim, 
that compliance with any loan conditions is purely 
permissive. 
In other words, they don't have to comply with 
any conditions of the loan imposed by the federal 
agency or the lender. This is ridiculous. 
We again refer to paragraph 4 of the statement 
of the executive director of the Respondent Redevel-
opment Agency of Salt Lake City (R. 195), under 
oath, that he is aware of the rules and regulations 
issued by the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) prescribing procedures to be 
followed in developing the subject parcel of land, 
and that he believed that all applicable provisions 
and requirements had been fairly followed and met 
by defendants (Respondents). 
This Appellant in making its bid in conjunction 
with three others certainly had the right to assume 
that the statute, rules and regulations would be com-
plied with; and that the request for bids by the Re-
spondents included the representation that they 
would comply with the conditions of the rules and 
regulations of Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) and the statute, section 11-
19-3, and that Appellant as a bidder would be 
required in its bid to also comply with those condi-
tions. 
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The statement that the only remedy that the 
Appellant has is against the lender for its failure 
to enforce conditions of the loan is ridiculous and 
ludicrous. 
Respondents' statement on page 8, "If a third 
party has any justiciable interest under such cir-
cumstances, it could only be against the lender for 
failure to enforce the conditions of such loan or 
grant, or against the state of Utah for failure to 
permit proper compliance by the borrower (Respon-
dent)." This just has no substance in law or in 
reason. 
Exhibit F, paragraph 4 thereof (R. 228-331) 
is only one example of what appellant alleges con-
stitutes non-compliance of Section 11-19-3, and the 
conditons of the loan made by the lender and re-
ferred to by the executive director Danny Wall (R. 
195). As set forth in Appellant's brief on page 6, the 
Respondents are required to adopt a resolution which 
provides among other things as follows : 
"(c) Approve the price, or minimum 
price, and determine that such price is not less 
than fair value." (R. 216) 
This Honorable Court is well aware that under 
Rule 56 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that the 
moving party, and in this case the Respondents, is 
asserting that on the basis of record as it then exists, 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. Durham v. Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc., 404 F.2d 
864, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 1594, 394 U.S. 998, 
22 L.Ed 2d 776. 
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We feel that the United States Court of Ap-
peals, Tenth Circuit, has aptly stated the interpre-
tation of Rule 56 in the case of James v. Atchison, 
Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 464 F.2d 173 
(1972), in which it makes the following statement: 
« * * * JJ. -g axiomatic, for example, 
that the moving party must demonstrate en-
titlement beyond reasonable doubt and that 
the courts, trial and appellate, must consider 
factual inferences tending to show triable is-
sues in a light favorable to existence of such 
issues. See 6 Moore's Federal Practice §§ 
56.15(1), (3), (8), 56.27(1); Avrick v. 
Rockmont Envelope Co., 155 F.2d 568, 9 F.R. 
Serv. 56c. 41, Case 7 (10th Cir. 1946;) Brod-
erick Wood Products Co. v. United States, 195 
F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1952); Clausen & Sons 
v. Theo Hamm Brewing Co., 395 F.2d 388 
(8th Cir. 1968). Thus, if there is an inference 
which can be deduced from the facts whereby 
decedent might recover, summary judgment is 
inappropriate." 
These federal cases interpreting Federal Rule 
56 are in accord with Utah interpretation of Rule 
56 under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In 
Welchman v. Wood, 9 Utah 2d 25, 337 P.2d 410 
(1959), the Utah Supreme Court said that "sum-
mary judgment is a drastic remedy and the courts 
should be reluctant to deprive litigants of an oppor-
tunity to fully present their contentions upon a 
trial." Id. at 411. Also in Housley v. Anaconda Com-
pany, 19 Utah 2d 124, 427 P.2d 390 (1967) the court 
reaffirmed this position by saying: 
"Prior decisions point out that summary 
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judgment is a drastic remedy and should be 
granted with reluctance. (Citations omitted). 
The plaintiffs should be granted the opportun-
ity of producing whatever evidence they wish, 
. . . " Id. at 393. 
SUMMARY 
The Appellant is simply asking for its day in 
court. The questions of fact and law presented in 
this case are much too important to be summarily 
dismissed, or to be dismissed without affording Ap-
pellant an opportunity to present its evidence. 
The issue is whether or not the Respondents 
have abided by the Utah law. The Appellant was an 
invited bidder, invited by the Respondents, and is 
entitled to have the law complied with. The Appel-
lant in substance has alleged that Respondents have 
not complied with the law of Utah by which it was 
created, and its powers given. The Respondents claim 
they have complied. There is no federal law involved. 
There are, however, several material and important 
factual issues which have not been settled and can-
not be settled without a trial on the merits of this 
case. 
The District Court in and for Salt Lake County 
has jurisdiction of this matter and is the proper 
forum in which Appellant's case should be tried. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CALLISTER, GREEN & NEBEKER 
By Louis H. Callister, Sr. 
W. Clark Burt 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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